There is a lot more going on behind the scenes between the leadership of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation and the party which sprung from its roots. What might be personal has certainly become political.
The conflict between the headquarters of NU (PBNU) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) that emerged in 2008 has reappeared in the public sphere. The trigger this time was an allegation by the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) that hajj implementation in 2024 was mismanaged, despite the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) claiming that it was successfully organised, even better than the previous hajj. A special committee of the DPR is investigating whether corruption was involved, especially on the issue of Indonesia’s hajj quota. In his capacity as DPR Deputy Speaker, Muhaimin Iskandar had pushed for this committee. Some question Muhaimin’s agenda, since he is also chairman of PKB and the investigation will implicate MoRA, which is headed by Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, the younger brother of NU Executive Council Chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf. This episode has revived tensions between PBNU and the followers of Yahya Staquf vis-à-vis those of Muhaimin.
Indonesians make up the most significant number of hajis (pilgrims) in the world. In 2013, Indonesia’s annual hajj quota was cut by 20 per cent due to construction on the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In 2015, for example, Indonesia’s 211,000 quota was trimmed to just 168,000. These cuts have gradually been restored; Indonesia still gets the largest quota from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its pilgrims. For 2024, Indonesia had 241,000 hajj places, apparently due to President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) lobbying of the Saudis (this is not new; in 2015, Jokowi had done the same). For 2025, Indonesia has been allocated 221,000 places.
However, 2024’s distribution of the hajj quota was allegedly problematic and scandalous. According to the law, only 8 per cent of Indonesia’s total quota (thus, over 19,000 pilgrims for 2024) should have gone on hajj plus but MoRA decided to approve over 27,000 spaces, a significant irregularity. The DPR Special Committee was set up to evaluate and trace the source of this violation.
The DPR committee argued that MoRA violated Law No. 8 of 2019 on the hajj system because it reduced the quota for the regular hajj, reallocating places to a category called “hajj plus” or special hajj. Hajj plus is where private travel agencies organise pilgrimages and determine the cost to pilgrims by calculating the price of the hajj visa from the Saudi government with additional costs for access to facilities (like airconditioned tents). In contrast, MoRA fixes the price for a minimal standard of hajj expenses for the regular hajj. (Editor’s Note: In Indonesia, those who do not wish to wait years or even decades for their hajj use two special schemes to circumvent the annual quota. Non-quota hajj spaces are special quotas from the Saudi government, while the author is referring to hajj plus or Ongkos Naik Haji, ONH, which are derived from Indonesia’s allocated annual hajj spaces.)
The DPR committee’s investigation has revived tension between PBNU and the PKB, a party long affiliated with NU. Yahya Staquf, the general chairman of NU, has said that this was a personal matter and conflict between him and Muhaimin Iskandar, where Muhaimin targeted him through Yaqut Cholil. Muhaimin has retorted that it was Yahya Staquf who twisted the issue to be a personal one. Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus, a senior and respected NU cleric) has tried to do some damage control, reiterating that what is happening is a personal affair between Yahya Staquf and Muhaimin.
This conflict…now involves the elites of both groups.
Whatever the case, since Yahya Staquf led NU in 2021, the relationship between PBNU and PKB has worsened. Yahya Staquf has tried to disassociate NU from PKB, and in leading NU, he adopts the spirit of the late Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and seems uncomfortable with Muhaimin’s leadership of PKB. Yahya Staquf regards one of his main missions as representing Gus Dur’s thought and ‘taking back’ the PKB, which he and his followers believe Muhaimin had “stolen” during the Yudhoyono administration in 2008. From Yahya Staquf’s perspective, the PKB under Muhaimin’s leadership should be reformed to be more transparent about its workings.
This conflict between PBNU and PKB now involves the elites of both groups. PBNU is seeking ways to seize PKB from Muhaimin’s leadership, and has collected evidence from former and current PKB leaders who are allegedly against Muhaimin’s direction of PKB. For instance, PBNU organised several meetings of NU’s ulamas, including a recent one in Jombang, which concluded with an ‘order’ for PBNU to improve PKB. Yahya Staquf had apparently convinced the ulamas and NU’s organisational apparatus that PBNU should intervene in PKB. As a follow-up, Yahya Staquf instructed all NU branches to evaluate PKB. It seems that PBNU aims to take over PKB before the new government starts work.
PKB is aware of this attempt by NU and has resisted PBNU’s interventions. PKB’s leaders see PBNU’s move as unconstitutional. Even though PKB is structurally under PBNU, the PKB comes under the law of the political parties, while PBNU is under the law of mass organisations. Based on this logic, PKB and NU are separate entities. That PBNU’s intervention has not so far been successful was suggested by the re-appointment of Muhaimin as PKB’s general chairman for 2024-2029 in its recent national congress (muktamar), held in Bali from 24-25 August.
Both PBNU and PKB have tried to remind Indonesia’s national leaders about their organisations’ importance in Indonesian politics. PBNU is confident that their closeness with President Joko Widodo would help them to reform and take over PKB, while PKB will enter the next administration with more DPR seats than before. It seems that the president-elect Prabowo Subianto looks well on PKB, meeting Muhaimin on 8 August 2024 to discuss the regional elections and other issues. That PKB has declared it would not support Anies Baswedan – Prabowo’s rival in the presidential election and Muhaimin’s running-mate – in this November’s race for Jakarta governor might have added to PKB’s favour in the incoming president’s eyes.
2024/278